Patronage trap: Ghana’s local governance under siege

Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, specifically Article 240(1), laid the foundation for a decentralised system of governance, leading to the formation of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) as the main local government units. 

Today, there are 261 MMDAs nationwide, designed to ensure that decision-making and development initiatives are brought closer to local communities. The Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936), puts the decentralisation framework into action.

It promotes grassroots participation. It also empowers local authorities to design and implement policies that meet the specific needs of their communities.

Legal regime

A key provision in the Local Governance Act, Section 5(1)(d), gives the President the power to appoint up to 30 per cent of District Assembly members.

This was meant to bring in technical experts such as planners, financial analysts, and public administrators.

These appointees were expected to complement elected members with professional insight and innovation. 

However, the system has increasingly been used for political patronage. Many appointments now go to party loyalists or political allies instead of qualified professionals. As a result, several appointees lack the skills needed to contribute meaningfully to local governance.

This trend has led to a decline in competence within the assemblies. Reports indicate that both appointed and elected members in some districts struggle with basic literacy, which severely hampers their ability to deliberate, oversee projects and plan effectively.

The issue is less about formal education and more about the capacity to fulfil the demanding responsibilities of local government, such as approving budgets, supervising infrastructure projects, and guiding local development.

Despite these challenges, the Local Governance Act does not set clear qualifications or eligibility criteria for presidential appointees, nor does it require relevant educational or professional backgrounds.

This legislative gap allows political considerations to override merit, undermining transparency, accountability and the effective functioning of the assemblies.

Consequences

The consequences of prioritising political loyalty over competence are significant: poor planning and implementation, diminished public trust, lack of innovation, and stalled development.

Organisations such as the Civil and Local Government Staff Association of Ghana (CLOGSAG) have raised concerns about the negative impact on professionalism and efficiency in public service, but meaningful reforms have been slow to materialise.

To restore the original purpose of decentralisation and improve governance at the district level, several steps are recommended:

Amend the Local Governance Act to establish clear qualifications and eligibility standards for presidential appointees.

Create independent vetting panels to evaluate candidates based on merit rather than political affiliation.

Invest in capacity building for all assembly members, both appointed and elected.

Promote transparency by publicly disclosing the backgrounds and qualifications of appointees.

Ultimately, political patronage should not be mistaken for good governance.

While appointing loyalists may benefit political parties, it undermines democracy and local development. 

The effectiveness of Ghana’s decentralised governance system depends on prioritising merit, professionalism and the public interest over partisanship, especially since district assemblies are responsible for essential services such as roads, schools and clinics.

Prioritising competence is crucial for the health of Ghana’s democracy and the well-being of its communities.

The writer is a Political Economist & Policy Strategist/Executive Director, Impact Group Network.

E-mail: kwesibeyese@gmail.com