Appointment to independent constitutional bodies needs reform

The appointment of heads of Independent Constitutional Bodies (ICBs) is a pivotal issue that warrants urgent attention in Ghana's democratic landscape. 

According to Article 70 of the 1992 Constitution, the responsibility for appointing the leaders and deputy heads of these crucial institutions rests solely with the president. This framework encompasses key bodies such as the Audit Service, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the Electoral Commission (EC).

By centralising such power in the hands of a single individual, it raises significant concerns regarding the autonomy of these institutions, questioning their ability to operate free from political influence.

Furthermore, Article 71 stipulates that the salaries and allowances for the appointed officials are also determined by the president, following recommendations from a committee of up to five individuals selected by him and under the guidance of the Council of State.

This arrangement not only consolidates power but also raises fundamental questions about the effectiveness and impartiality of these bodies. When financial compensation and appointments rest with the president, there exists the risk that these institutions may prioritise loyalty to the executive branch over their essential function, such as checks on government power. Such a dynamic can severely undermine the credibility of these institutions and erode public trust in the democratic process.

Controversies

The EC has found itself at the heart of numerous controversies, especially regarding the president’s appointments, which often spark contentious political debates irrespective of groundbreaking reforms carried out by the Commission to make its work effective.

An increasing concern is that electoral disputes stemming from perceptions of bias or lack of independence within the EC could escalate violence. Such fears are not unfounded, as history has shown that the manner in which key electoral bodies operate directly impacts the stability of the nation. 

This controversy extends beyond the Electoral Commission, reaching into other strategic state institutions including the judiciary, the police and the military. Politicians, who frequently criticise the presidential appointment system while in opposition, often adopt the same practices once they ascend to power, highlighting a troubling cycle that undermines public confidence.

The issue of appointing heads of ICBs manifests a deeper crisis: the same political elites that engage in opportunistic criticism of the system often perpetuate it when it serves their interest.

This creates a scenario where the trust that citizens place in critical state institutions diminishes, leading to broader implications for democracy itself. 

Democracy declines

Professor Jeffery  Haynes, in a recent Graphic article (“When democracy dies”, 2 November) discussing the decline of democracy in Ghana, notes that the nation, historically viewed as a beacon of liberal democracy, is now facing challenges in crucial areas such as credible elections, access to justice and freedom of association.

This regression has contributed to its classification as an ‘autocatiser’ in 2024, fundamentally linked to waning public trust in key state institutions.

Given the significant implications of allowing the president to appoint the heads of ICBs exclusively, one must question whether this is a sustainable practice. Is it not time for an elite consensus to emerge, focusing on national development and delineating clear guidelines for systemic appointments that genuinely serve democracy?

Political elites must consider reforms that could foster a more impartial and transparent appointment process. What barriers exist that prevent political leaders from empowering an independent body to handle such appointments? 

The potential for creating mechanisms that allow institutions to elect their own officials, thereby enhancing their independence from political pressure, should be fully explored. 

Alternative methods

The current practice, which allows one team to choose “the referees for the match”, inevitably compromises the fairness and impartiality of governance. 

It might be prudent to investigate alternative methods for appointing heads of ICBs, aiming to strengthen their independence and enhance their capacity to uphold justice.

Proposals could include implementing a transparent selection process involving diverse stakeholders or granting appointment powers to an independent body insulated from political influence.

In conclusion, it is clear that reevaluating the mechanisms for appointing heads of independent constitutional bodies is an essential step towards revitalising Ghana's democracy.

By developing a political environment that prioritises accountability over allegiance and promotes institutional independence, we can restore public trust in governance and ensure a brighter future for democracy in Ghana.

The writer is a political scientist