The Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) has issued an investigation report faulting Charles Adu Boahen, a former Minister of State at the Ministry of Finance, for engaging in influence peddling or trading in influence.

In the OSP's investigative findings issued today [Oct 30, 2023], the Special Prosecutor, Kissi Agyebeng said his office had more than sufficient basis to so conclude, after forensic investigation and analysis of the investigative documentary titled 'Galamsey Economy,' produced by Tiger Eye P.I., a private investigation agency headed by investigative journalist, Anas Aremeyaw Anas.

The OSP said Influence peddling or trading in influence is a significant index of corruption worldwide, and it is deprecated under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).

"Though Ghana is a state party to the UNCAC, the nation has yet to specifically prohibit influence peddling or trading in influence as a criminal offence. Consequently, the OSP lacks the legal mandate to pursue prosecution in this matter," it added.

"The OSP  joins calls by civil society groups, particularly OccupyGhana, on the passage of a Corrupt Practices Act and a Conduct of Public Officers Act. These legislative measures are essential for the establishment of a stronger legal framework and more effective mechanisms to combat and penalise corruption and corruption-related offences," it said.

A-G is best placed to handle case

The OSP therefore concluded that the suspected corruption and corruption-related offences involving Charles Adu Boahen, do not fall directly under the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP).

The OSP said those alleged crimes can be handled by the Attorney-General.

In the OSP's conclusion, the A-G is the one best placed to handle it and not OSP because of jurisdictional issues.

On November 14, 2022, President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo requested the OSP to investigate the said allegations against Mr. Adu Boahen contained in an investigative documentary titled ‘Galamsey Economy’ produced by investigative journalist, Anas Aremeyaw Anas.

Further action on Charles Adu Boahen

The Special Prosecutor in his report stated that though the conduct of Charles Adu Boahen amounts to trading in influence or influence peddling, which is closely associated with corruption, there is no actual criminal prohibition of his acts in respect of which the OSP has a mandate to further act.

Again on that reckoning, the Special Prosecutor directs the closure, at this time, of the investigation in respect of allegations of corruption and corruption-related offences involving Charles Adu Boahen contained in the investigative documentary titled Galamsey Economy published by Tiger Eye P.I. The investigation may be re-opened should the circumstances and further facts so dictate.

It added that the non-prohibition of most predicate acts of corruption and corruption-related offences engenders impunity of malevolent conduct and the erosion of democratic tenets, which spawn formidable hurdles in the fight against corruption, especially in the public sector.

Pass Corrupt Practices Act

On this score, the OSP calls for the passage of a Corrupt Practices Act to comprehensively codify the prohibition of all forms of corruption. Further, the OSP joins up with the positively persistent.

The Attorney-General has the police, the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), the Economic and Organised Crimes Office (EOCO), the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and others.

The offence of influence peddling has not been codified in Ghanaian criminal statute hence the OSP's call for passage of Corrupt Practices Act and Conduct of Public Officers Act to deal with the offence of influence peddling.

Report of Investigation into Alleged Commission of Corruption and Corruption-Related Offences involving Charles Adu Boahen, 30 October 2023

OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION

1.0 Introduction
1.1 The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) presents this report on an
investigation into suspected corruption and corruption-related offences 
involving Charles Adu Boahen, a former Minister of State at the Ministry of 
Finance. 

1.2 The report has been heavily redacted to safeguard national security and to 
protect the privacy of persons investigated and interviewed.

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2.0 Charles Adu Boahen

2.1 Charles Adu Boahen is a Ghanaian politician and a member of the governing 
New Patriotic Party. He is the son of Professor Albert Adu Boahen (deceased), 
a historian and politician, who was the New Patriotic Party flagbearer in the 1992 
presidential elections in Ghana. Charles Adu Boahen served as a Deputy Minister 
for Finance during the first term of President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo. 
Upon re-election for a second term, President Akufo-Addo appointed Mr. Adu 
Boahen as a Minister of State at the Ministry of Finance.

2.2 The President relieved Mr. Adu Boahen of his position as Minister of State at 
the Ministry of Finance in November 2022 on the back of allegations of the 
commission by Mr. Adu Boahen of suspected corruption and corruption-related 
offences. 

3.0 Referral
Complaint 

3.1 By a referral dated 14 November 2022 President Nana Addo Dankwa AkufoAddo requested the OSP to investigate allegations of corruption and corruptionrelated offences involving Mr. Adu Boahen contained in an investigative
documentary titled Galamsey Economy published by a celebrated Ghanaian 
investigative journalist, Anas Aremeyaw Anas and his associates operating under 
the corporate name of Tiger Eye P.I., a private investigation outfit headquartered 
in Accra.

3.2 By a complaint dated 13 November 2022 and received on 15 November 2022 
Tiger Eye P.I. requested the OSP to investigate Mr. Adu Boahen for corruption 
and corruption-related offences arising from the investigative documentary 
referred to in paragraph 3.1. Tiger Eye P.I. attached an audio-visual recording 
contained on a flash drive together with a transcript of the audio-visual recording 
to the complaint.

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3.3 The complaint alleged that, through its sting operations, Tiger Eye P.I. audiovisually recorded Mr. Adu Boahen in the act of his commission of corruption 
and corruption-related offences. The complaint stated that undercover agents of 
Tiger Eye P.I., posing as businessmen who were interested in investing in Ghana, 
met with Mr. Adu Boahen and tabled their investment plans and proposals to 
him. The complaint alleged that, sensing an opportunity to cash-in on his 
position as a Deputy Minister of Finance, Mr. Adu Boahen demanded twenty 
per cent (20%) of the value of the proposed initial investment or ten per cent 
(10%) upfront payment of the value of the proposed initial investment and postinvestment sharing of the proceeds of the investment. 

3.4 The complaint also alleged that Mr. Adu Boahen offered to introduce the 
undercover agents to the President and the Vice President in aid of establishing
them as very influential persons in Ghana. It was alleged that this offer was 
premised on Mr. Adu Boahen’s stated close ties to the President – akin to an 
uncle and a nephew relationship, and his political connections to the Vice 
President.

3.5 The complaint further alleged that Mr. Adu Boahen demanded Two Hundred 
Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to be given to the Vice 
President for the purposes of facilitating a meeting to be set up by Mr. Adu 
Boahen between the Vice President and the undercover agents. 

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4.0 Investigation

4.1 The Special Prosecutor, upon determining that the referral and complaint spoke 
to the same set of allegations against Mr. Adu Boahen and that they were within 
the mandate of the OSP, authorised the commencement of preliminary 
investigation into the matter in accordance with regulation 5(1)(b) and 
subsequently, a full investigation under regulations 5(1)(c) and 6 of the Office of 
the Special Prosecutor (Operations) Regulations, 2018 (L.I. 2374).

4.2 The investigation was conducted with as little intrusion into the privacy of 
persons as the circumstances permitted.

4.3 The contents of the flash drive attached to the complaint filed by Tiger Eye P.I. 
were forensically verified as a true reflection of the events represented thereon.

4.4 The investigation spanned a period of six (6) months. The identities of persons
are disclosed where necessary.

5.0 The Context 

5.1 The allegations against Mr. Adu Boahen are situated in the context of an 
undercover investigative journalistic type of sting operations. Typically, a sting 
operation takes the form of the creation of a platform or opportunity for persons 
believed or suspected to be disposed to or involved in the commission of a crime 
to actually commit the crime, thus providing hard evidence for their successful 
prosecution and punishment. In the context of undercover investigative 
journalism, sting operations are usually characterised by the feigning of interest
in a matter by undercover agents and the provision by them of opportunities for 
the commission of prohibited acts by the person of interest through winning the 
confidence of the person of interest for the person of interest to reveal his or 
her criminal activities or for the person of interest to commit a crime. The 
undercover agents usually secretly audio-visually records the acts of the person 
of interest as evidence of their criminal culpability.
 
5.2 Sting operations are controversial and divisive of opinion. This largely stems 
from the fact that the undercover agent never has a real intention of committing
a crime and yet sets up the props and the platform for the commission of a crime 
by the person under investigation. In particular, the undercover investigative 
journalistic type evokes intense reaction from its critics. The triggers of the 
consternation of the opponents of this type of evidence collection are summed 
up under three heads. First, the opposers of undercover investigative journalistic 
sting operations argue that unless sanctioned by the state, a private person has 
no business provoking and encouraging the commission of a crime by a person 
and proceeding to audio-visually record the person in the act of the commission 
of the crime without that person’s consent. In the estimation of the opposers, 
the audio-visual recording of a person without his consent violates that person’s 
right to privacy.

5.3 The opponents of undercover investigative journalistic sting operations also 
argue that it amounts to entrapment. On this score, the opposers posit that the 
person caught on camera committing criminal acts had no intention of 
committing a crime from the onset but went along with the seed sown by the 
undercover agent and the suggestion and encouragement of the undercover 
agent. And that but for the poisonous seed sown by the undercover agent and 
his active suggestion and encouragement, the person caught in the act and on 
tape would not have committed the crime.

5.4 Further, some opponents of undercover investigative journalistic sting 
operations label it as investigative terrorism. In their estimation, this type of 
evidence collection amounts to harassment of the person caught in the act on 
camera.

5.5 Herein lies the problem. Or, is it? For the answer, we invite a reflection on the 
actions of three persons of interest in the following illustration. 

5.6 Let us name our first person of interest Kofi Mensah. Let us say that Kofi 
Mensah has no criminal record. Let us assume that Kofi Mensah is not criminally 
minded and he has no intention of committing a crime. Let us place Kofi Mensah 
at a quiet and deserted underground parking lot of an apartment building in 
Accra. Now, Kofi Mensah is happily whistling to himself as he leisurely strolls 
through the parking lot to his car. He notices a vehicle with its doors ajar. He 
draws closer and sees no one in the vehicle. He bends to inspect the interior of 
the vehicle and he sees an iPhone lying on the driver seat. Upon further 
inspection, he concludes that the owner of the vehicle must have purposely left 
the doors ajar to airdry the interior and in the process forgot to take the iPhone 
and left it unattended. 

5.7 Kofi Mensah has several courses of action. He could simply decide to mind his 
own business and walk away while pondering over the carelessness of the owner 
of the iPhone. Afterall, the law does not require him to be a Good Samaritan. 
He could also, community-minded, assure by whatever means that the owner 
would not lose the iPhone to a criminally minded person who chances by. There 
is yet a third choice. Kofi Mensah could pocket the iPhone and walk off without 
the intention of returning it or having it returned to the owner. If Kofi Mensah 
takes the third course of action, he commits the crime of stealing – since by so 
doing he has dishonestly appropriated the iPhone without the consent of the 
owner. 

5.8 Let us leave Kofi Mensah in his thoughts for a moment and introduce our 
second person of interest. Let us name our second person of interest Kwaku 
Kumi. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi has no criminal record. Let us say that 
Kwaku Kumi is not criminally minded and he has no intention of committing a 
crime. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi is an undercover investigative journalist. Let 
us say that unbeknownst to Kofi Mensah, Kwaku Kumi is the owner of the 
iPhone and the exposed vehicle. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi is carrying out an 
undercover investigative journalistic sting operation upon a tip off that burglars 
regularly break into vehicles at that parking lot. To verify the claims or otherwise,
he intentionally arranged the scene of the unattended iPhone and exposed
vehicle and hid nearby to observe the actions of passersby vis-à-vis his prop.

5.9 Kwaku Kumi approaches the scene and he immediately senses Kofi Mensah’s 
moral conflict and dilemma. Kwaku Kumi suggests to a startled Kofi Mensah 
that they should sell the iPhone and split the proceeds. Kofi Mensah initially 
recoils from Kwaku Kumi’s suggestion. However, upon further prompting he
agrees with Kwaku Kumi and he walks out of the parking lot with the iPhone 
upon proposing that Kwaku Kumi should meet up with him at an agreed 
rendezvous for the sharing of the proceeds. Let us say that Kwaku Kumi audiovisually recorded the entire encounter from the moment Kofi Mensah walked 
up to the opened-up vehicle till when he walked out of the parking lot with the 
iPhone. Let us say that upon a tipoff by Kwaku Kumi, Kofi Mensah is 
apprehended by the police as he attempts to sell the iPhone. Let us say that the 
relatives of Kofi Mensah are incensed that but for Kwaku Kumi’s suggestion 
and further prompting, Kofi Mensah would never have stolen the iPhone. And 
they further claim that Kwaku Kumi entrapped Kofi Mensah and actively 
harrased him to commit the crime and that Kwaku Kumi is not an investigative 
journalist after all but an investigative terrorist. They are particularly incensed 
that Kwaku Kumi audio-visually recorded the entire crime.

5.10 Let us now introduce our third person of interest, Kwame Samson. Let us say 
that Kwame Samson has no criminal record. Let us assume that Kwame Samson 
is not criminally minded and he has no intention of committing a crime. Let us 
place Kwame Samson at the same parking lot and by the same exposed vehicle 
and iPhone. Upon seeing the iPhone on the driver seat, Kwame Samson quickly 
grabs the iPhone and runs out of the parking lot before Kwaku Kumi, who was 
hiding nearby, could approach him. Let us say that Kwame Samson is 
apprehended by the police as he attempts to sell the iPhone. Let us say that the 
relatives of Kwame Samson are utterly shocked by his actions. They had always 
known him as a quiet and gentle young man.

5.11 If we are to collectively engage in objective detached reflection devoid of 
personal biases and interests, it would seem obvious to every reasonable person 
that Kofi Mensah is no special and certainly no different from Kwame Samson. 
They are both thieves – they stole the iPhone. They did not commit a crime of 
necessity driven by a justifiable or excusable desire to overcome a greater harm.
The factors that motivated them to steal the iPhone may be different. However, 
they are both criminals of opportunity. True it is that they set off initially without 
previous deliberation or prior or advanced plans to steal the iPhone. Yet, upon 
being presented with the opportunity to steal the iPhone, they calculated that the 
benefit to them of stealing the iPhone would outweigh the risk of being harmed 
or apprehended in the process. Thus, they took advantage of the situation and 
stole the iPhone. They had several options. They did not have to steal, as no one 
compelled them to steal. They acted on their own free will. It makes no

difference that in the case of Kofi Mensah he acted after the suggestion and 
further prompting by Kwaku Kumi. In the end, he willingly stole the iPhone. He 
was not under any form of force or duress exerted by Kwaku Kumi. The 
suggestion and further prompting to steal was not coercion. It was merely a test 
of moral resolve. It does seem to lie very ill in the mouths of the relatives of Kofi 
Mensah to assert that he would not have stolen the iPhone but for the suggestion 
and further prompting by Kwaku Kumi. Afterall, no one knows what is on a 
person’s mind. The devil himself does not know what it is on man’s mind – it is 
said.

5.12 Then again, it does seem to lie very foul in the mouths of the relatives of Kofi 
Mensah to claim that he was entrapped by Kwaku Kumi to steal the iPhone.
Entrapment entails tricking an unwary person to commit a crime. The person so 
tricked is, by his lack of caution or prudence, unaware that he is engaged in a 
criminal enterprise, and he is led in that unwitting state to commit a crime. It 
does seem clear that Kwaku Kumi did not trick Kofi Mensah to steal the iPhone. 
He presented Kofi Mensah with the opportunity and suggested the benefit of 
the crime to him and offered him a cut of the proceeds. Kofi Mensah was not 
unaware that he was engaged in a criminal venture. Indeed, he knew at all times 
from the moment Kwaku Kumi approached him that he was being invited to a 
criminal adventure. 

5.13 In this illustration, Kofi Mensah’s actions show that he would seize the 
opportunity to commit a crime if presented with one – especially where, as in 
this case, the benefits far outweigh the risks. And it beggars belief that the 
opponents of undercover investigative journalistic sting operations blame not 
the perpetrator of the crime but rather placate them as victims of undercover 
agents. And upon that perplexing altar of appeasing the evildoer, they proceed 
to chastise undercover agents as though they were the scourge of the earth.

5.14 Persons like Kofi Mensah are not victims of circumstances caught in a web they 
are unable to extricate themselves from. They are not luckless victims who 
unknowingly walk into a criminal den. If they are victims, then they are victims
of their own begetting and their inability to willingly walk away from crime. The 
responsibility for the crimes they commit should be laid fully on them and not 
on any suggester or encourager or provider of opportunity.

5.15 On another score, it does seem to do much violence to language for the relatives 
of Kofi Mensah to claim that Kwaku Kumi terrorised and harassed him to steal 
the iPhone. Kwaku Kumi did not coerce or by any means compel Kofi Mensah 
to steal the iPhone. It was not akin to the gunman situation writ large – steal the 
iPhone or I shoot you. Kwaku Kumi’s suggestion merely emboldened Kofi Mensah 

and steeled his resolve. If we will not commend persons like Kwaku Kumi, 
certainly we should not condemn them. They are underserving of our reproach. 
The persons deserving of condemnation and the stamp of opprobrium are 
persons like Kofi Mensah. On every level, it does seem clear that the only reason 
why the relatives of Kofi Mensah would complained is that the morally 
conflicted Kofi Mensah got caught stealing an iPhone – and on camera too.

5.16 The issue of invasion of privacy may forever feature in the discourse – since the 
perpetrator of the crime is audio-visually recorded without his consent in sting 
operations. However, the Supreme Court has decided that better it is to trump a 
person’s right to privacy to unearth or expose the commission of a crime,
especially where it is near impossible to detect the crime except by covert audiovisual recording.

5.17 In any case, it seems abundantly clear that the insistence of the opponents of 
undercover investigative journalistic sting operations that the right to privacy of 
a criminal is invaded in a sting operation is akin to requiring undercover agents 
to disclose to persons being investigated that they are being investigated and to 
enquire from them whether they would consent to be audio-visually recorded in 
the process of the commission of the crime. Only an overenthusiastic legal 
system would insist on such bizarre requirements. In any case, which criminal 
worth his odious calling would agree or consent to be audio-visually recorded by 
undercover agents in the act of the criminal’s commission of a crime.

5.18 We have deliberately taken pages to illustrate, in some detail, the arguments of 
the opponents of sting operations and the tenability or otherwise of such 
arguments. At the OSP, we do not find the arguments against undercover 
investigative journalistic sting operations attractive. In our gathered experience 
in investigating, prosecuting, and preventing corruption and corruption-related 
crime, it seems to us that the views of the opposers of undercover investigative 
journalistic sting operations go around in circles without any real utility except 
to provide inexcusable grounds for the benefit of persons who have a propensity 
to commit crimes when offered the opportunity. And the summation of the 
arguments of the opponents of sting operations is merely that the criminal got 
caught on camera in the act of committing a crime.

5.19 The OSP welcomes and encourages sting operations, including the undercover 
investigative journalistic type. This is so especially because corruption and 
corruption-related activities are extremely difficult to detect and prove. The 
traditional methods of pen and paper investigations are attended by debilitating 
limitations in the fight against corruption and in gaining access to the operations 
of suspected corrupt persons as criminals become more sophisticated and 
develop obscure and intricate designs to avoid detection. Indeed, regulation 
1(1)(d) of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (Operations) Regulations, 2018 
(L.I. 2374) mandates the OSP to act on investigative journalism reports and 
sources. The OSP reckons undercover investigative journalistic sting operations 
output as investigative journalism reports and sources.

5.20 Globally, the trend is significantly shifting toward the acceptance of 
unconventional techniques of detecting and fighting crime, including the 
embracement of sting operations. In the context of combatting corruption, 
Article 50 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption encourages 
state parties to permit surveillance and undercover operations, and to allow for 
the admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom within the limits of their 
domestic laws. To that admonishing must we pay fidelity.

6.0 Findings

6.1 Tiger Eye P.I. is a private investigation outfit incorporated in Ghana with a keen 
interest in the investigation of corruption cases of public interest. The agency 
received several reports and complaints and reports from members of the public 
about suspected corrupt practices at the Ministry of Finance, especially in respect 
of allegations upfront bribe-taking and the demand by some officials of the 
Ministry for unlawful payments of money from persons who had business with 
the Ministry. Tiger Eye P.I. commenced investigation in 2017 in respect of 
Charles Adu Boahen, who was then a Deputy Minister of Finance. The 
investigation was aimed at ascertaining whether Mr. Adu Boahen was engaged 
in the stated corruption and corruption-related activities.

6.2 Operatives of Tiger Eye P.I. conducted an undercover investigation over the 
course of twelve (12) months by disguising themselves as sheikhs, interpreters 
of the Arabic language for sheikhs and as officials of the Al Baraka Banking 
Group, a public investment business firm headquartered in Manama in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain. The investigation was quite elaborate and carefully planned
and executed – covering several meetings in Ghana and in the United Arab 
Emirates and the purchase of round air tickets for two (2) persons (excluding
Mr. Adu Boahen) on two (2) occasions between Accra and Dubai.

6.3 Circa March 2017, the investigative journalist who was shot to death in January 
2019 in Accra, Ahmed Hussein Suale, an operative of Tiger Eye P.I., approached 
Solomon Amponsah, the desk officer in charge of Agricultural Development 
Bank projects at the Ministry of Finance. Mr. Suale introduced himself in 
disguise to Solomon Amponsah as Ahmed Divela, a representative of the Al 

Baraka Banking Group. Mr. Suale tabled a proposal that the Al Baraka Banking 
Group were interested in investing in Ghana, particularly in the banking sector.
Mr. Suale sounded credible as he linked the intended investment to an impending 
banking and financial sector restructuring.

6.4 Convinced by Mr. Suale that the Al Baraka Banking Group genuinely intended 
to invest in Ghana upon the terms stated, Solomon Amponsah broached the 
intended investment to Mr. Adu Boahen. Whereupon Mr. Adu Boahen advised 
Solomon Amponsah to refer the supposed Ahmed Divela to Isaac Emil OseiBonsu, a private legal practitioner operating from Accra for the purposes of due 
diligence and the ascertainment of the feasibility of the intended investment.

6.5 Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu satisfied himself as to the bona fides and existence of the 
Al Baraka Banking Group after several meetings in Accra and in Dubai in the 
United Arab Emirates with the supposed Ahmed Divela and Solomon 
Amponsah and other persons introduced as officials of the Al Baraka Banking 
Group. Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu naturally became convinced of the capability of 
the Al Baraka Banking Group to undertake the outlined intended investment. 
The only missing piece in the puzzle was convincing Mr. Adu Boahen to meet 
with the representatives of the Group, as Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu was made to 
believe.

6.6 Convincing Mr. Adu Boahen was not a straightforward matter. Initially, he was 
altogether unreceptive of the idea of meeting with the supposed representatives 
of the Al Baraka Banking Group. Subsequently, he softened his stance and he 
suggested a meeting in Accra. The undercover agents demurred. They insisted 
on a meeting in Dubai. Eventually, Mr. Adu Boahen agreed to meet with the 
supposed representatives of the Al Baraka Banking Group in Dubai by taking a 
brief detour to Dubai on his way to Singapore on official government business.

6.7 In February 2018, Mr. Adu Boahen, Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon 
Amponsah were met at the Dubai airport by the undercover agents and taken to 
a hotel. Two meetings took place at the hotel. The first meeting was attended by 
the undercover agents disguised and posing as officials of the Al Baraka Banking 
Group, Mr. Adu Boahen, Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon Amponsah. 
Upon expression of interest by the undercover agents of intended investment in 
the financial sector in Ghana through the establishment of an Islamic bank, Mr. 
Adu Boahen dutifully walked the supposed officials of the Al Baraka Banking 
Group through the processes of setting up a bank in Ghana.

6.8 There was nothing remarkable about this meeting and had it ended there this 
matter would not have come up for investigation by the OSP. However, the 
undercover agents had other designs. It turned out that that meeting was
masterfully staged as a mere officious preparatory sideshow to set the tone for 
the second meeting.

6.9 Then came the second meeting, immediately after the first meeting. This was an 
exclusive one. Isaac Emil Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon Amponsah were dropped 
from the list of attendees. Mr. Adu Boahen was ushered alone into a different 
room for further discussions with undercover agents disguised as a very wealthy 
sheikh and an interpreter of the Arabic language. This meeting was held in less 
formal circumstances, and it was characterised by deeper and frank discussions 
that formed the entire backdrop of the purpose of the sting operation. It was 
designed to enable Mr. Adu Boahen to talk freely in the absence of Isaac Emil 
Osei-Bonsu, and Solomon Amponsah. It worked. This is because Mr. Adu 
Boahen became less inhibited in his speech. 

6.10 At the second meeting, the supposed wealthy sheikh expressed his desire of 
investing about half a billion United States dollars in Africa. He indicated that 
Ghana was one of the countries of interest and that he wanted to be connected 
to persons of the highest political influence for the purpose of establishing his 
business footprint. Mr. Adu Boahen, intending to assure the supposed sheikh of 
his political office, influence and connections, launched into his family history 
about his father, the relationship between the President and his father, his close 
ties to the President, which is akin to an uncle and nephew relationship, and his 
close affinity to the Vice President.

6.11 The supposed sheikh picked up on Mr. Adu Boahen’s assurances of the comfort 
of his high political influence and connections, and he laid the cards of the whole 
purpose of the sting operation on the table by enquiring as to the percentage cut 
Mr. Adu Boahen would take in respect of the intended investment in the 
financial sector in Ghana. After a bit of hesitation, Mr. Adu Boahen, on his own
volition, suggested twenty percent (20%) of the intended investment as his cut.
Mr. Adu Boahen must have meant this percentage cut demand as a shot in the 
dark. This is because he could not believe his immense good fortune and he 
could not hide his utter surprise as the supposed sheikh readily agreed to his 
suggestion. Indeed, Mr. Adu Boahen stated that he thought the sheikh would 
reject the suggested percentage cut as too pricey. 

6.12 Upon further enquiry by the supposed sheikh as to any further required 
commitments to secure the proposed high political influence in Ghana, Mr. Adu 
Boahen suggested the prudence of the payment of an appearance fee of Two 
Hundred Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to the Vice President
– with the explanation that being a Muslim, the Vice President would be very 
keen to assist in the establishment of the proposed Islamic bank.

6.13 The supposed sheikh offered Mr. Adu Boahen Forty Thousand United States 
dollars (US$40,000.00) in cash as shopping money. The supposed sheikh placed 
the cash on a piece of furniture close to Mr. Adu Boahen, and he accepted and 
collected the cash with gratitude. During the investigation, Mr. Adu Boahen 
stated that he politely accepted the cash gift in order not to offend the sensibility 
of a potential wealthy investor looking to invest half a billion United States 
dollars in Ghana. 

6.14 The undercover agents secretly audio-visually recorded the entirety of both 
meetings.

6.15 In the high political office he occupied, it ought reasonably to have occurred to 
Mr. Adu Boahen that his bargain for twenty percent (20%) of the value of the 
proposed investment and his receipt of a cash gift of Forty Thousand United 
States dollars (US$40,000.00) from the supposed sheikh was outrightly 
improper. Mr. Adu Boahen exhibited lack of sound judgment. His claim that he 
accepted the cash gift to avoid offending the supposed sheikh lies very thinly;
and his suggestion of the payment of an appearance fee of Two Hundred 
Thousand United States dollars (US$200,000.00) to the Vice President was quite 
reckless – especially as the Vice President was unaware of the business he was 
conducting and had not tasked him to demand money of whatever description 
on his behalf. All the indices point to the conclusion that Mr. Adu Boahen’s
principal motivation was his own personal gain though he intimated to the 
supposed sheikh that he was driven by the potential developmental benefits to 
Ghana of the proposed investment.

6.16 The conduct of Mr. Adu Boahen amounts to trading in influence or influence 
peddling. This is the practice of using one’s influence or connections in public 
office or with persons in public office to obtain favours or preferential treatment 
for oneself or for another person, usually in return for payment. These acts have 
not been specifically prohibited in our jurisdiction as crimes per se. However, they 
are gravely frowned upon and punishable as crimes in some jurisdictions. This 
is because such acts are closely associated with corruption offences like using 
public office for profit and they also form the building blocks of general
corruption. Then again, since they are closely associated with corruption, they 
have the effect of delegitimising democratic governance.

6.17 Mr. Adu Boahen engaged in trading in influence or influence peddling by 
employing his political office and close personal ties to the President and the 
Vice President to obtain favours of an actual cash gift and a prospective
percentage cut of the proposed investment by the supposed sheikh. This is so 
notwithstanding the fact that the proposed investment was a prop and could not 
have actualised since there were in fact no actual investors. Mr. Adu Boahen 
stood to make a substantial personal gain had it been an actual investment 
proposal. It is no thanks to Mr. Adu Boahen that the investment proposal was 
never actually intended. Thus, he cannot seek refuge in its never-to-come-tofruition attribute.

6.18 Mr. Adu Boahen certainly did not know that the whole enterprise was like a 
motion picture prop. He thought it was an actual investment proposal. Indeed, 
Mr. Adu Boahen admitted that he believed he was dealing with a genuine wealthy 
sheikh who had the advertised wherewithal to make good on the proposed 
investment. Therefore, his actions should be considered on account of his state 
of mind and state of knowledge at the time of the second meeting – which was 
that he thought he had bagged for himself a real prospect of a windfall of twenty 
percent (20%) of a coming investment worth Five Hundred Million United 
States dollars (US$500,000,000.00) in addition to receiving and pocketing Forty 
Thousand United States dollars (US$40,000.00).

7.0 Further Action

7.1 Though the conduct of Mr. Adu Boahen amounts to trading in influence or 
influence peddling, which is closely associated with corruption, there is no actual 
criminal prohibition of his acts in respect of which the OSP has a mandate to 
further act.

7.2 On that reckoning, the Special Prosecutor directs the closure, at this time, of the 
investigation in respect of allegations of corruption and corruption-related 
offences involving Charles Adu Boahen contained in the investigative 
documentary titled Galamsey Economy published by Tiger Eye P.I. The 
investigation may be re-opened should the circumstances and further facts so 
dictate.

7.3 The non-prohibition of most predicate acts of corruption and corruption-related 
offences engenders impunity of malevolent conduct and the erosion of 
democratic tenets, which spawn formidable hurdles in the fight against 
corruption, especially in the public sector. On this score, the OSP calls for the 
passage of a Corrupt Practices Act to comprehensively codify the prohibition of 
all forms of corruption. Further, the OSP joins up with the positively persistent 
calls of the pressure group, OccupyGhana for the passage of a Conduct of Public 
Officers Act to properly regulate the conduct of public officers. 

8.0 Commendation

8.1 The OSP commends the President for the referral to the OSP for the conduct 
of investigation into suspected corruption and corruption-related offences 
involving Mr. Adu Boahen.

8.2 The OSP commends Tiger Eye P.I. led by Anas Aremeyaw Anas for conducting 
the sting operation in respect of suspected corruption and corruption-related 
offences involving Mr. Adu Boahen, and for filing a complaint with the OSP in 
respect of the sting operation for the commencement of the present 
investigation.

8.3 The OSP commends the lawyers of the various persons who attended the OSP
for their professionalism.
Kissi Agyebeng
The Special Prosecutor
The Republic of Ghana
30 October 2023

Writer's email: enoch.frimpong@graphic.com.gh 

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