A voter

Democracy’s vulnerable safeguards

Dr John Osae-Kwapong Politics Apr - 12 - 2025 , 09:57 4 minutes read

Ghanaians have made their peace with democracy.

I often point to the Afrobarometer survey and how Ghanaians have answered the “support for democracy” question as the basis for making this assertion.

Ghana has participated in all 10 rounds (1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2022, 2024) of the survey and, cumulatively, seven out of 10 Ghanaians (74.7 per cent) say that “democracy is preferable to any other form of government.”

What is more reassuring is that during periods of low satisfaction with democracy (2014, 2022, 2024), support for democracy remained high.

Another reassuring signal of our commitment to democracy is the percentage of citizens who answer “don’t know” to the preference for democracy question.

In Round 2 (2002), as many as four out of 10 (37 per cent) Ghanaians answered, “don’t know.”

Since then, here is the trajectory – 2005 (11 per cent); 2008 (Five per cent ); 2012 (Two per cent ); 2014 (13 per cent); 2017 ( Two per cent); 2019 (Two per cent); 2022 (One per cent); and 2024 (One per cent).

I describe this period, especially between 2017 and 2024, as one of democratic certainty.

That is, we really do mean it when we say, “democracy is preferable to any other form of government.”

Vulnerable safeguards

Anyone who has paid close attention to the various democracy and good governance indices and surveys will know that Ghana’s democracy is facing some major challenges. And we need to fall on our safeguards. But our safeguards, in my opinion, are facing their own vulnerabilities.

It sounds like an oxymoron to describe safeguards as vulnerable. Let me illustrate with two examples.

First, civil society. Actors in this space engage in important work to help strengthen democracy and good governance.

Their work touches all facets of the country’s democracy architecture – election monitoring, anti-corruption discourses and proposals, citizens’ awareness campaigns on national issues, policy advocacy, accountability demands on government, efforts to make government more transparent, partaking in coalition activities, conducting research and disseminating findings, to mention a few.

These activities have contributed to offering another line of defence on behalf of citizens and the protection of Ghana’s democracy.

Their ability to maintain generally high levels of independence outside of the partisan structures and political culture offers their voice legitimacy and credibility.

There are generally no entry barriers erected by the State to prevent the formation of civil society organisations.

This has earned Ghana a high score (94/100) in the most recent (2023) Ibrahim Index of African governance on the indicator civil society entry and exit, which measures “the extent to which government controls entry and exit by civil society organisations (CSOs) into public life.

Nonetheless, scores on other measures of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance do raise concerns.

For example, the country’s score on the indicator “Absence of Harassment of Civil Society” dropped significantly from 99(2014) to 79(2023).

Also, on the indicator “Civil Society Consultation” which “assesses the extent to which major civil society organisations (CSOs) are routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members,” Ghana’s score, which increased from 75 to 87(2014 to 2017), has since dropped to 67(2023).

Second, opposition political parties. Ghana’s multiparty democracy is dominated by two political parties (NDC and NPP).

There are other registered political parties, but their level of vibrancy is not comparable to that of the NDC and NPP.

This has resulted in the role of vibrant opposition, which serves to hold ruling parties accountable, as a rotation between the two main parties.

When in opposition, they have managed to play the role of constantly highlighting the shortcomings of government by demanding transparency or investigations into matters of corruption.

They have a history of organising demonstrations to draw the ruling party’s attention to poor governance and deplorable socio-economic conditions. In Parliament, they try to serve as the voice of checking government by providing the kind of scrutiny on government budgets, policies, and programmes that typically a ruling party majority is not inclined to do.

Whatever the case, the activities of opposition political parties provide citizens with an alternative voice and perspective on governance matters.

But the vulnerability opposition political parties face is this; their electoral motives potentially undermine their role as a safeguard, in that it is easy to ask whether their demands for accountable and transparent governance are driven by genuine concerns for Ghana’s democracy or by a desire to score political advantage in anticipation of the next election.

It is also instructive to note that trust in opposition political parties is low and has ranged between seven per cent and 26 per cent over nine rounds of the Afrobarometer Survey.