When democracy breaks down — Lessons from Guinea

On September 5, 2021, Guinea’s military overthrew President Alpha Condé. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies described the reasons for the coup as–“autocratic overreach, economic mismanagement, and eroding democratic norms.”

The coup in Guinea raised concerns about the fate of democracy in the sub region because of similar successful military coups in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali between 2020 and 2023. 

On September 29, 2023, Ghana’s President Akufo-Addo expressed concerns to his ECOWAS counterparts saying among other things that “democracy in West-Africa is in danger.” 

Guinea is an example of democratic retrogression in the West Africa sub region. Democratic retrogression here means the risk of a country’s democratic architecture (institutions and practices) deviating from its ideal state. Such deviations manifest itself in several ways including – a) weakening and loss of confidence in democratic institutions; b) growing citizen dissatisfaction; c) electoral politics serving narrow interests; d) violation of democratic norms by political elites; etc. 

When these signals are not addressed, countries are likely to meet the ultimate manifestation of retrogression – collapse of the democratic state and institutions with non-democratic alternatives emerging.   

It has been roughly three years now since Guinea suffered the ultimate form of democratic retrogression. What do citizens say are the consequences of democratic retrogression? Do citizens experience changes in how they view democracy, democratic norms, and assess the dividends of governance? 

For answers I turn, as always, to the Afrobarometer survey. The availability of the most recent data on Guinea (Round 10, 2024) offers an opportunity to answer this question. 

To provide answers, the analysis compares data from Round 8 (2021), which is the year Guinea’s ultimate democratic retrogression occurred, to Round 10 (2024). 

Lessons from Guinea

Support for democracy.  The percentage of Guineans who say “democracy is preferable to any other form of government” has dropped from seventy-seven per cent (77%) in 2021 to seventy per cent (70%) in 2024.

Support for non-democratic forms of government. In 2021, approval of non-democratic forms of government were as follows – one party (27%); one man (19%); and military (21%). After the retrogression, approval has remained generally unchanged for one party (-2%); and one man (+2%) but has significantly increased for military rule (+10%). 

Support for democratic norms.  Presidential term limits of no more than two terms had the strong support (77%) of citizens in 2021 which has further strengthened (84%) post democratic retrogression. Another democratic norm, parliamentary oversight of the president, had sixty-six per cent (66%) support among Guineans in 2021, increasing to seventy-five per cent (75%) in 2024. Lastly, support for elections has seen a slight drop from eighty-three per cent (83%) to seventy-nine per cent (79%). 

Confidence in democratic institutions. In 2021, the percentage of Guineans who expressed trusting the following three institutions “a lot” were as follows – presidency (37%); parliament (22%); and the courts (14%). In 2024, the level of trust looked like this – presidency (31%); parliament (21%); and courts (18%). On the perceptions of corruption, the percentage who answered “none of them” to the question how many are involved in corruption at a given institution remained unchanged between 2021 and 2024 – presidency (14% vs 14%); parliament (12% vs. 11%); and courts (10% vs. 7%). 

Political rights and freedoms. In 2021, the percentage of Guineans who expressed feeling “completely free” about these rights were as follows – a) speech (57%); b) political association (77%); and voting (86%). In 2024, each had experienced significant declines - a) speech (-12%); b) political association (-15%); and voting (-8%).

Economic dividends of governance. Between 2021 and 2024, there has been no significant positive improvements in the percentage of Guineans who rate government’s handling of key economic issues as “fairly well/very well” – a) management of the economy (from 29% to 25%); b) creating jobs (from 12% to 13%); and improving the living standards of the poor (from 15% to 16%). At the same time, the percentage who expressed optimism about the economic conditions of the country dropped slightly from forty-seven per cent (47%) to forty-three per cent (43%). 
 
Conclusion

Analysis of the selected indicators above points to, in my opinion, four things about democratic retrogression. First, it gradually has the potential to weaken support for democracy and certain democratic norms. Second, non-democratic alternatives do not appear to improve confidence in democratic institutions or the economic dividends of good governance. 

Third, its biggest negative impact is felt in the political rights and freedoms of citizens. 

Lastly, it lends legitimacy to military rule. Although fifty-eight per cent (58%) say “restore civilian rule as soon as possible,” sixty-three per cent (63%) say “it is legitimate for the armed forces to take control of government when elected leaders abuse power for their own ends.”
The overall take away message is simple – monitoring of the risk signals is key so that the ultimate form of retrogression can be preempted. 

The writer is the Project Director, Democracy Project.