Relatively, Ghana has many laws and institutions intended to promote accountability. The 1992 Constitution establishes bodies such as Parliament, the Judiciary, the Electoral Commission, the Auditor-General, the Council of State and the National Development Planning Commission. Additionally, laws have been enacted to regulate political parties, public finance, state-owned enterprises and public officials.
Despite this extensive framework, accountability remains weak. Political parties do not always meet financial-reporting requirements, Parliament is sometimes perceived as insufficiently independent of the Executive, and public appointments are frequently criticised for favouring political loyalty over competence. National development plans are often abandoned when governments change, while many state-owned enterprises continue to make losses despite detailed governance rules.
These problems show that formal rules and institutions alone cannot guarantee effective governance. Informal norms including group loyalty, reciprocal obligations, political patronage and excessive deference to authority, can undermine constitutional institutions, particularly when political power is concentrated.
This is not an argument that Ghanaian culture is inherently corrupt or incompatible with democracy. Ghanaian society also values communal responsibility, consensus, respect and stewardship. Indeed, Article 39(1) of the Constitution requires the State to integrate appropriate customary values into national life. Nevertheless, constitutional reform must recognise that certain informal expectations can make independent public action difficult.
Loyalty and public duty
Ghanaians often have strong ties to their families, communities and political parties. These relationships provide support and belonging but also create expectations of loyalty. Governance suffers when loyalty to a group becomes stronger than duty to the State.
Instances abound where a public official may hesitate to sanction a member of the governing party. A board member may be unwilling to challenge the minister responsible for the appointment. A Member of Parliament may place party unity above the scrutiny of government expenditure.
In each case, the formal control exists, but informal loyalty determines how the official exercises authority. Passing additional laws will therefore achieve little unless the institutions responsible for enforcing them are sufficiently independent.
Concentrated appointment powers
Ghanaian society traditionally respects elders, chiefs and public authorities. Although this contributes to social order, it can discourage legitimate questioning of powerful officials.
For instance, the President exercises extensive influence over appointments to constitutional bodies, public institutions, state-owned enterprises and local government. The Constitution also permits Members of Parliament to serve as ministers. These arrangements make independent oversight difficult.
Consequently, an official appointed by the President may hesitate to challenge the appointing authority. A governing party MP hoping for ministerial appointment may be reluctant to scrutinise the Executive. A board member may confuse loyalty to a minister with responsibility to the institution.
Constitutional arrangements should not depend on individuals risking their careers or political opportunities to challenge powerful people. Appointments to major public offices should therefore be transparent and competitive. Vacancies should be advertised, qualifications and integrity independently verified, and shortlisted candidates subjected to interviews, examinations or competency assessments. The President could retain the authority to appoint while no longer controlling the entire selection process.
African countries such as Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa use different combinations of public advertisements, qualification checks, interviews, assessments and parliamentary participation. Ghana needs to adopt and adapt appropriate elements of these systems.
Money, politics and patronage
The growing cost of political competition intensifies the problem. Candidates need significant resources to contest party primaries and national elections. Those who cannot finance their campaigns often rely on wealthy supporters and political financiers, who may later expect appointments, government contracts, access to state resources or protection from regulation.
This produces a vicious circle whereby private money finances elections; electoral victory gives politicians control over appointments and public opportunities; supporters receive positions, contracts and influence; and access to public office generates resources for the next election.
The result is a weakened control environment in which loyalty can replace competence and regulators become indebted to political networks. Expensive filing fees, campaign costs and payments to delegates may also exclude capable candidates without access to substantial funding.
Political financing and appointment reforms must therefore proceed together. Financial disclosure without appointment reform does not prevent financiers from seeking rewards after elections. Appointment reform without financial transparency leaves the sources of political influence hidden.
Regulating political parties
The Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574) requires parties to submit accounts and other information to the Electoral Commission. However, delayed filings and inconsistent enforcement demonstrate that granting legal powers does not guarantee their use.
Because political parties seek control of government, the body regulating them needs genuine independence and clear constitutional authority. The Constitution should expressly require the Electoral Commission to regulate political parties and political finance. The Commission should regularly report to Parliament and the public on party compliance and enforcement action.
Legislation should continue to prescribe operational matters such as filing deadlines, audit procedures, donation limits, campaign expenditure ceilings and penalties. However, the Commission’s independence, enforcement responsibility and reporting obligations require stronger constitutional protection.
Strengthening parliamentary oversight
Party loyalty also affects Parliament’s ability to hold the Executive accountable. Under Article 78 of the Constitution, MPs may serve as ministers. Consequently, governing-party MPs who are ministers, or hope to become ministers, may be unwilling to challenge the President. Party discipline can discourage scrutiny of budgets, loans, appointments and legislation, contributing to the perception that Parliament sometimes operates as a “rubber stamp.”
Separating ministerial office from parliamentary membership would improve oversight. Parliamentary committees, particularly the Public Accounts Committee, should also be required to conduct timely hearings and follow up on audit findings, recoveries and sanctions.
An Auditor-General’s report does not automatically produce accountability. Accountability occurs only when findings lead to corrective action, recovery of public funds and appropriate consequences.
Protecting national development planning
Ghana has repeatedly abandoned or replaced long-term development plans after changes of government. The Seven-Year Development Plan ended after the 1966 change of government, while Ghana Vision 2020 was never fully implemented. Later administrations introduced Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) I and II and Ghana Shared Growth, Development Agenda (GSGDA) I and II, and Ghana Beyond Aid.
Although these programmes contained valuable policies, Ghana still lacks a stable national development framework capable of surviving political transitions. Governments understandably want visible achievements associated with their political identities, but this can undermine long-term investments whose benefits may emerge under future administrations.
The Constitution should therefore protect the continuity of national development planning. It should safeguard the independence and coordinating role of the National Development Planning Commission, the duration of national plans and a transparent amendment process.
Governments should remain free to select projects, budgets and implementation methods. However, they should explain how their programmes support the national plan or publicly justify significant departures from it.
Entrenching essential safeguards
Constitutional entrenchment gives important safeguards protection against alteration by temporary political majorities. It should be reserved for foundational principles rather than administrative details.
The Constitution should protect transparent appointments, institutional independence, security of tenure, access to information, minimum disclosure requirements and enforceable accountability. Technical standards, filing procedures and reporting technology should remain in ordinary legislation so they can be updated when necessary.
Conclusion and recommendations
Ghana’s governance challenges cannot be resolved simply by passing more laws. Formal controls will continue to fail when political loyalty overrides competence, campaign support creates expectations of reward and respect for authority prevents legitimate scrutiny.
Constitutional reform should preserve Ghana’s positive values of community, stewardship and shared responsibility while protecting institutions from patronage, nepotism, selective enforcement and excessive political influence.
Ghana should therefore:
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Introduce open, competitive and independently assessed public appointments.
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Give the Electoral Commission or the Independent Registrar and Regulator of Political Parties an explicit constitutional duty to regulate political parties and political finance.
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Establish donation and campaign-expenditure limits, timely disclosure and effective sanctions.
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Strengthen the separation between Parliament and the Executive, including reform of Article 78.
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Require parliamentary committees to act promptly on audit findings.
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Protect the independence of the NDPC and the continuity of national development planning.
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Entrench only essential safeguards while leaving operational details to legislation.
The central principle should be clear: entrench fundamental safeguards, preserve administrative flexibility and ensure that every constitutional control is supported by an independent institution, reliable information and enforceable consequences.
