It is Türkiye, not Turkey: Exclusion disguised as an analysis
This rejoinder responds to an article published in the Daily Graphic on January 24, 2026, under the title “Turkey risks turning Gaza reconstruction into a geopolitical trap.”
The reliance of the article on assumptions, selective framing, and misreading of context is glaring enough to warrant some insights for some lucidity and correction.
This response follows the structure of the original article, addressing its key assertions directly.
Misreading the Human Reality Amid War and Mass Civilian Suffering: Reconstruction is not an Ideological Test
Gaza is not an abstract geopolitical theatre; it is a perceptible humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in front of us.
Tens of thousands of civilians, children, women, and the elderly have been killed.
Entire neighbourhoods have been erased, hospitals destroyed, water and electricity systems terminated, and families displaced multiple times.
More than 120 journalists have been killed while documenting the war, an unprecedented toll that alone underscores the scale of the devastation being witnessed in human history.
Against this backdrop, the suggestion that Türkiye’s participation in reconstruction would “legitimise extremism rather than peace” fundamentally misreads what is at stake. Reconstruction is not an ideological endorsement; it is a response to a collapsed civilian life.
Rubble does not produce moderation, and exclusion does not create stability. Rather, delaying rebuilding entrenches despair, dependency, and radicalisation.
The real danger lies not in an inclusive humanitarian engagement, but in turning reconstruction into a political gatekeeping exercise, while civilians remain without homes, schools, hospitals, clean water and other necessities of life.
The article’s treatment of Türkiye’s engagement with Hamas rests on a narrow and Western-centric assumption that political contact equals endorsement, and that designation by a select few defines global legitimacy.
The world, however, is larger than a few geographies such as the EU, the United States, and Israel.
Hamas is not designated as a terrorist organisation by all states, and diplomatic engagement with de facto actors is a long-standing feature of conflict mediation worldwide.
Contact is not empowerment. Dialogue is not sponsorship. If engagement alone were grounds for exclusion, numerous international actors, past and present, would be disqualified from mediation and reconstruction roles across the globe.
What matters is not who speaks to whom or who judges whom, but how reconstruction is structured, monitored, and governed.
Oversight, transparency, and multilateral frameworks, not ideological litmus tests, are what prevent diversion and misuse of aid.
Singling out Türkiye while ignoring identical practices by others reveals bias, not robust analysis.
The Erdoğan Factor
The Erdoğan Factor: Expecting Silence in the Face of Mass Civilian Killings Is Not Neutrality. Invoking President Erdoğan’s rhetoric or the public activism of figures associated with him as evidence of malign intent reflects a misunderstanding of both politics and humanity.
When thousands of children and women are killed, when images of destroyed homes and mass graves circulate daily, is voicing discontent and activism abnormal?
Millions of people across continents, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America have reacted with protest, condemnation, and calls for accountability. Are they all to be dismissed as extremists?
To imply that moral reaction must give way to silence to qualify as a humanitarian actor is to redefine neutrality as indifference.
States and leaders are not expected to be mute in the face of mass civilian suffering. Political speech does not determine reconstruction mechanisms; institutions, oversight and accountability do.
Türkiye’s Regional Role: A Mediator Invited, not Self-Imposed
Türkiye’s regional engagement is portrayed as ambition bordering on manipulation, yet this ignores a crucial fact: It is not just Gaza, Türkiye has repeatedly been invited into mediation and stabilisation roles precisely because of its credibility.
In Gaza’s post-war planning discussions, Türkiye’s inclusion has not been unilateral; it has been welcomed by many actors, including by the United States, because of its demonstrated capacity to engage multiple sides, deliver humanitarian assistance, and operate within multilateral frameworks.
Selective scrutiny that treats Türkiye’s regional role with suspicion, while accepting similar or more intrusive roles by others as normal, is not neutrality.
It is a demonstration of a double standard.
Engagement as a Tool for Stability, not a Risk to Be Avoided
Rather than framing Türkiye’s involvement as a limitation, it should be understood as an asset—when properly structured.
Engagement does not mean unchecked influence.
Reconstruction today operates under strict international mechanisms: phased funding, audits, multilateral supervision, and civilian-focused delivery.
Exclusion does not reduce risk; it narrows options. Responsible engagement governed by rules reduces instability far more effectively than isolation.
The assumption that Türkiye cannot operate within such frameworks is unsupported and contradicts Türkiye’s performance in similar roles.
A Record of Mediation and Stabilisation: Ukraine, Africa, and Palestine
As indicated, Türkiye’s track record contradicts the article’s thesis.
In Ukraine, Türkiye played a central role in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, preventing a global food crisis that would have devastated Africa and the Global South.
Türkiye was widely acclaimed and recognised for this distinctive role.
In Africa, while some external actors have encouraged fragmentation and legitimised division, most visibly in breakaway contexts.
Türkiye has consistently supported dialogue, territorial integrity, and reconciliation, including the Ankara Declaration between Ethiopia and Somalia.
In Palestine, Türkiye has worked through UN mechanisms, contact groups, and humanitarian channels to reduce civilian suffering and secure access not to advance militancy.
This pattern is one of mediation and stabilisation, not exploitation and endorsement of extremism.
Security Through Reconstruction, Not Through Delay and Exclusion
Security concerns are legitimate, but delaying reconstruction is not a viable security strategy.
Every actor involved in Gaza’s reconstruction operates under the same structural reality: Hamas’ de facto control.
Excluding Türkiye does not change this fact.
What mitigates risk is oversight, transparency, and coordination, not the nationality of the contributors.
Delaying reconstruction prolongs civilian suffering, weakens governance, and creates conditions in which insecurity and extremism thrive.
A broad, inclusive reconstruction coalition strengthens, not undermines, security outcomes.
Conclusion:
The Real Trap Is Over-Politicising Humanitarian Reconstruction
Excluding Türkiye does not protect Gaza; it delays rebuilding and deepens civilian suffering. Reconstruction governed by oversight, transparency, and accountability is the path to stability.
Ideological framing and exclusion are not neutral; it is abandonment.
Ironically, the real geopolitical trap lies in paralysing reconstruction through suspicion and selective framing.
Gaza’s civilians have suffered not only from bombs but also from blocked materials, conditional aid, and endless debates over who is “allowed” to help.
Rebuilding Gaza is not about rewarding influence. It is about restoring life, dignity, and hope where devastation has been allowed to persist for far too long.
