Preserving a decentralised republic
Some comments recently made by the respected governance expert, Professor Kwamena Ahwoi, on decentralisation seemed to have caused quite a stir.
He spoke during discussions on Ghana’s new National Decentralisation Policy Framework, a policy intended to transfer more power, resources and development opportunities to local governments and regions across the country.
As Ghana’s Minister of Local Government and Rural Development for over a decade (from 1990 to 2001), and one of the leading voices on decentralisation reforms leading to the District Assembly concept in the mid-to-late 1980s, Prof. Ahwoi’s words do command serious attention, so perhaps it is unsurprising that his comments have occasioned varying reactions.
The argument
Essentially, Prof. Ahwoi cautioned that Ghana must be careful not to create a decentralisation system that could “give an excuse for Ghana to break up”.
Laying the background to his point, he recalled that Ghana, like most African countries except for Liberia and Ethiopia, is an artificial construct borne out of colonialism, by which I presume he meant the carving up of the continent by European powers back in the 19th century into territories of influence for their benefit.
‘Without colonialism, there would have been no Ghana,” he emphasised.
I agree with this assertion.
The ‘Scramble for Africa’ at the Berlin Conference of 1885-86 led to the cobbling together of various ethnic groups into monolithic territories under various European powers, without due regard to local dynamics and realities, and with these groups at various, different stages of development.
At independence, these territories morphed into the modern African states with these hang-ups and simmering tensions, their borders jealously guarded, even if these artificial lines did split whole ethnic groups into nationals of different countries.
It has directly contributed to several civil wars and, in some cases, secession, as some groups have sought to revert to the status quo ante, with varying degrees of success.
He warned that while decentralisation was a good thing, it was quite easy to move from decentralisation to secession through separation, federalism, and balkanisation, and then went on to illustrate his ‘slippery slope’ argument with examples from Nigeria, the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.
To buttress his point, he indicated that in a country with significant ethnic groups such as Asante or Dagbon that could stand as countries in their own right, it was possible in the future, for instance, for a ‘troublesome Asantehene’ to push a secession agenda and succeed.
African succession perspectives
With the greatest of respect, I must disagree with Prof. Ahwoi’s argument on this matter.
In examining the thrust of his argument through the prism of experiences on the African continent, no evidence emerges to establish that both the attempted and successful secessionist initiatives were driven by over-decentralisation, even in part.
Curiously, with respect to the countries he cited, he did not claim over-decentralisation as even a cause, never mind the cause.
In the Nigeria/Biafra example he cited, a complex set of issues post-independence led to great disaffection among the Igbos, and ultimately drove the secession effort.
In Ethiopia/Eritrea, the annexation of Eritrea in 1962 by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia after the UN Resolution-led federation earlier in 1952 drove huge resentment among Eritreans that erupted and led to the 30-year secession war.
In Sudan/South Sudan, the root cause of the secession rested on cultural and religious differences.
Alleged attempts to ‘Arabise’ the entire country through the imposition of Sharia Islamic law sparked resentment in the Christian south and fuelled the secession war.
Similarly, elsewhere in Africa, there is no evidence that secession stories, from Casamance (Senegal), to Azawad (Mali), Somaliland (Somalia) and even our own sporadic Western Togoland flares, have been driven, wholly or partly, by over-decentralisation of power or resources.
Beyond Africa
Of course, beyond Africa, several secession stories emerge elsewhere, and in Western Europe, for example, the borders have been drawn and redrawn several times over the centuries through wars, empire-building and alliances constructed and subsequently dissolved, sometimes through violence. Africa was on that organic path when colonialism rudely and violently interrupted the process.
In the case of the Soviet Union, which the good professor alludes to, political openness (glasnost) and economic reconstruction (perestroika) in the late 1980s were the huge driving forces that led to the crumbling of high censorship that had held the federation together, following which suppressed ethnic and nationalist sentiment rose, particularly in the Balkan states.
That is what primarily broke the Soviet Union, not too much decentralisation.
In Scotland, the roots of nationalist fervour date back to the 12th and 13th centuries and continued long before devolution of power in 1997 and the renewed clamour for an independent Scotland.
Again, in places like the Catalan region in Spain and Quebec in Canada, the clamour for secession has been grounded in distinct minority identities and cultures within the larger framework of the state.
In Canada, a restive independence movement has been growing in the oil-rich province of Alberta, built on a long-held sense that Alberta is overlooked by decision-makers in Ottawa.
A referendum on this is scheduled for October 19, this year.
Interestingly, the United States is probably the prime example of decentralisation, with the delegation of significant political, administrative and fiscal authority from the federal government to the individual states and local municipalities.
Yet, aside from the secession of some eleven ‘slave states’ that led to the US Civil War of 1861-1865 and preserved the union, there has hardly been a significant whimper of secession since then.
Preserving the republic
I do not accept the argument that our national unity is threatened by more decentralisation because a future ‘troublesome’ Asantehene or Yaa Naa could ride on this empowerment to seek to lead his people into secession.
Indeed, when parts of the country perceive a certain injustice and deprivation arising out of the concentration of power and resources in the capital and its enclave, especially when that part of the country contributes significantly to the nation’s wealth through natural and other resources, there is a real risk of growing resentment on whose wave the hypothetical ‘troublesome Asantehene or Ya Naa’ could ride in seeking seccession.
The bottom line, therefore, is fairness in the distribution of resources and addressing clear imbalances.
Accra is not Ghana and must not be seen as such.
At each level - regional, municipal, district ‒ the citizen must feel a sense of full participation in the polity, not reduced to dreaming of and longing for the capital because that is where all the ‘action’ happens.
We need more, not less, decentralisation.
In addition to strong, thriving localities, there is a need for a state that actively promotes a strong sense of national identity, belonging and rallying point.
This is key to preserving our republic.
It is a lot of purposeful hard work, and I believe the United States has been able to deftly weave these two together, so that one can be a proud Texan or Californian and still be a proud American citizen without any contradiction.
It is possible to be a proud Asante, Ga, Ewe or Frafra, and still be a proud Ghanaian.
Rodney Nkrumah-Boateng.
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