Assessing the effectiveness of Ghana’s Electoral Commission: Comparative analysis (2)
In summary, Ghana and Nigeria both rely on presidential appointments of their Electoral Commissioners.
However, Nigeria’s additional layer of requiring Senate’s confirmation provides checks and balances relative to the Ghanaian procedure.
To a greater extent, the emphasis of South Africa and the United Kingdom on parliamentary approvals promotes greater transparency and independence in how electoral commissioners are appointed. Interestingly, the appointment processes of most francophone West African countries, such as Benin, Senegal and Mali, as noted in a Friedrich Ebert Stiftung report (FES, 2010), follow systems similar to those of South Africa and the UK, where multi-actor panels and civil society involvement play a key role in appointing commissioners.
In contrast, the Anglophone countries in West Africa, such as Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Liberia, tend to follow a model closer to Ghana’s, where the President leads the appointment process, often with some input from advisory bodies like the Council of State.
Arguably, Ghana’s precarious appointment provisions have contributed to the current public mistrust and lack of confidence in the EC. After Dr Afari Gyan’s retirement in June 2015, President John Mahama appointed Mrs Charlotte Osei, who chaired the conduct of general elections in 2016, which was won by President Akuffo Addo.
However, President Akuffo Addo dismissed Charlotte Osei and her two deputies in June 2018 over ‘misbehaviour and incompetence’, amid protests from the opposition party and civil society organisations (CSOs). President Akuffo Addo later appointed a new EC boss, two deputies and a member of the commission in 2018.
Again, Ghanaian civil society organisations have criticised some of the appointments to the EC as partisan and likely to intensify public mistrust of the commission (CDD, 2023).
As Mrs Mogtari suggests, the EC chair position must be advertised and vetted by Parliament (MyJoyonline, 2024).
Functions
As outlined in Article 45(a–f) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the EC has a constitutional mandate for the compilation and periodic revision of the national voters’ register, the demarcation of electoral boundaries and importantly, the conduct and supervision of all public elections and referenda.
It also has a role to educate the public on the electoral processes and their purpose, as well as to undertake programmes for the expansion of registration of voters and perform other functions as may be prescribed by law. Broadly, the functions of the EC are centred on the integrity of Ghana’s electoral system.
As the control of the finances of the political parties and the submission of annual statements of accounts are not included in the constitutional functions, the EC seems incapable of enforcing its compliance and also turns a blind eye to inaccurate returns from the political parties.
In the case of Nigeria, the INEC is constitutionally responsible for organising, conducting and supervising all federal and state elections. Significantly, the constitutional functions of the INEC require it to register and regulate political parties, to monitor their internal operations and ensure compliance with electoral laws.
The functions also include the arrangement for the annual examination and auditing of the finances and accounts of political parties and the publication of the audit reports to promote transparency.
South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) is also responsible for organising and managing all elections and referenda, ensuring they are free and fair, and declaring results within legal timeframes.
It also compiles the voters’ roll, registers political parties, promotes voter education, engages with political stakeholders and advises on electoral law reforms, making it a key player in upholding democracy in the country.
The UK’s Electoral Commission, while not directly involved in running elections, plays a critical regulatory and oversight role. It monitors and reports on the conduct of elections, reviews and recommends changes to electoral laws, regulates political parties and campaign finances, oversees the registration of political parties and maintains standards for voter registration.
Additionally, it provides public education on electoral matters and works with the media to ensure balanced and accurate coverage of party-political broadcasts, helping to maintain transparency and public trust in the electoral system.
Conclusion
The credibility of electoral processes is central to the integrity and stability of any democratic society. Electoral Commissions, political parties and general elections play indispensable roles in sustaining democracy.
However, as highlighted in the comparative analysis, the effectiveness and integrity of these institutions are largely shaped by the constitutional and legal frameworks governing their establishment, appointment procedures and the extent to which they are empowered to enforce electoral laws and carry out their constitutional mandates.
As shown, the constitutional and legal framework of Ghana’s EC in the 1992 Constitution has not been materially amended since the 1969 Constitution to reflect the current changing political situation.
The appointment process in article 43(2) and 70(2) of the 1992 Constitution is not structured to facilitate transparency, impartiality and accountability.
The citizenry is not adequately informed of the processes leading to the appointment by the President.
Moreover, the Commission currently lacks an explicit constitutional mandate to monitor or regulate party finances or sanction non-compliance.
This inadequate mandate weakens the Commission's capacity and erodes public trust.
In contrast, Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution clearly directs INEC to register political parties, monitor their internal operations and ensure compliance with electoral laws.
It is also mandated to arrange for the annual examination and auditing of party funds and accounts, and publish reports on such audits for public information.
South Africa’s constitutional and legal framework stands out for its transparency, impartiality, independence and integrity, as well as its inclusive appointment process, while the UK’s EC, though not directly involved in election administration, serves as a strong regulatory and oversight body, with an emphasis on impartiality and transparency.
These differences highlight the crucial role of strong legal and institutional frameworks, committed leadership and active civil society participation in ensuring credible and transparent electoral processes.
Recommendations
• Enhance transparency in appointments
Ghana needs to revise its appointment procedures for commissioners by incorporating parliamentary vetting and public advertising of nominations. This would improve accountability and reduce perceptions of political bias, as observed in the South African and UK models.
• Ensure independence and security of tenure
Electoral commissioners should have secure, clearly defined terms of office, with mechanisms that guard against arbitrary dismissal. Removal should follow due process and require parliamentary or judicial oversight, as pertains in South Africa.
• Strengthen legal and constitutional frameworks for regulating political financing activities
The constitutional provision on the Electoral Commission should be amended to provide the mandate for monitoring the internal operations of political parties and ensuring their compliance with electoral laws.
Sanctions must be provided for violations of campaign financing regulations and electoral laws.
The constitutional functions of Nigeria’s INEC provide a useful template for empowering the Electoral Commission in this regard.
• Promote civic education and stakeholder engagement
Electoral Commissions should increase efforts in public education on voter rights, electoral procedures and the dangers of vote buying and clientelism.
Strengthening collaboration with civil society organisations and media can help restore public confidence.
• Establish independent political finance monitoring bodies
Ghana may consider creating independent bodies or specialised departments within the Electoral Commission dedicated to overseeing party finances and campaign expenditures, ensuring timely disclosure and transparency.
For example, Nigeria’s INEC is legally empowered to arrange for an audit of political party accounts annually and publish the findings, a practice that promotes transparency and public accountability in political party financing.
• Leverage technology to improve electoral integrity
The use of biometric registration, electronic transmission of results and real-time financial disclosures can greatly enhance the transparency and credibility of electoral processes.
