Dysfunctional Executive Oversight and Accountability in Ghana (6)

Public sector audit conducted by the auditor general is an essential part of the process of accountability for public money and the governance of public services (ACCA,2016).

ACCA’s work on the public sector has highlighted that effective scrutiny or oversight by parliaments requires the provision of high-quality financial reports and accounting information as well as independent audit.  Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of the above oversight functions of Parliament depends heavily on public sector auditing provided by the Auditor General.

Public Accounts Committee of Parliament

In Ghana, the Public Accounts Committee, considered the audit committee of parliament, is Parliament’s most important committee in oversight and scrutiny as it helps to hold the government to account for its use of public funds and resources by examining the public accounts.  It should be noted as then Leader of the Minority Party, the current Speaker, Mr Alban Bagbin, chaired the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament from 2001 to 2004.

In order to perform its oversight functions effectively, members of Parliament require objective and fact-based information about how well the government collects and spends public funds, that will enable them to assess governance and performance issues. In most cases this information is provided by a State Auditor (or Auditor General). Although the relationship between the Auditor General and PACs has evolved differently in the different jurisdictions, the work of the Auditor General is an essential element. Accountability academics and politicians like McGee, Stapenhurst et al. have observed that the committees´ relationship with the Auditor-General plays an important role in the performance of the committee’s functions.

However, the current relationship between Parliament and the Auditor General as defined by the 1992 Constitution, seems limited to the submission of the A-G’s report for Parliament’s debate under Articles 187(2) and 184 of the Constitution. Moreover, the establishment of the A-G and the Audit Service as Public Officer and Public Service respectively by the 1992 Constitution means they are independent and distinct of Parliament. As a result, the collaboration is not given, it has indeed become more difficult, and therefore, does not augur well for effective collaboration in the preventive oversight.

Furthermore, Article 187(7)(a) prevents Parliament from requesting the A-G to conduct audit and investigations into other areas of irregularities not captured in the A-G’s current mandate as it will be considered as direction or control of the A-G in the performance of his functions under the Constitution.

Consequently, the engagement between A-G and Parliament has been limited to the consideration of reports submitted by the A-G to Parliament with adverse effect on the capacity of Parliament to carry out its important Executive oversight function. This has created a gaping loophole which impacts adversely on the achievement of effective public financial accountability.

It is now normal and best practice globally for parliaments to appoint their auditor generals and board members of their Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) as pertains in most commonwealth countries like the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and particularly in the United States.  Currently, long-lasting improvements are also being made globally in National Audit Acts and Constitutions to enhance accountability and transparency in the management of public funds. The global trend is for the Auditor General to be associated with the legislature as an officer of Parliament and be both responsible and accountable to Parliament.

However, the constitutional arrangements governing the Office of the Auditor General in Ghana have not seen any significant improvements since the enactment of the 1969 Constitution, the relic of the 1992 Constitution, and the Audit Service Act 2000, Act 584. 

Constitutional Mandate of the Auditor General

The Office of the Auditor-General is one of the key institutions for oversight, accountability, monitoring and evaluation in the Ghanaian governance process.  

Generally, the 1992 Constitution and the Audit Service Act 2000, Act 584 mandate the Auditor General of Ghana, to hold the Government accountable to Parliament by reporting significant issues in the use of public resources.  Particularly, Article 187(2) of the Constitution requires the A-G to audit and report on public accounts of Ghana and the accounts of all public offices, and under Article 187(5) submit his or her report to Parliament within six months after the end of the immediately preceding financial year. In the report, the A-G is required to draw attention to any irregularities in the accounts audited and to any matter which in his opinion ought to be brought to the notice of Parliament for its debate and dealing with matters arising.

Additionally, section 13(e) of the Audit Service Act empowers the Auditor-General to ensure that programmes and activities in the public sector have been undertaken with due regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness in relation to the resources utilised and results achieved.

In what is more fundamental to the fight against corruption, Article 187(7)(b) of the 1992 Constitution empowers the A-G to disallow any item of expenditure which is contrary to law and surcharge amount involved to the persons responsible for such item.  Unfortunately, since its operationalization after the ruling of OccupyGhana versus A-G, the State has failed to collect the

When sufficiently independent and funded, the A-G’s office could be a strong institution with the needed expertise and resources to assist Parliament and the citizenry in holding government accountable and managing the wealth of the nation.  As by expressing objective opinion on whether public resources are being efficiently managed, the state auditor helps public organisations and instill confidence among citizens and stakeholders for political legitimacy.

Challenges of the current oversight and accountability mandates of Parliament and Auditor General

The Parliament of Ghana has been criticized for its failure to emerge as a credible and effective check on presidential and executive power.  A lot of factors including the following have been enumerated as causing a low rating of Parliament’s oversight function:

1. Lack of technical support and resources attributed to Parliament’s dependence on the Executive for budgetary appropriation. It is claimed that among the three arms of government, Parliament is the least resourced considering the citizen’s great expectation.
2. Substantive lack of interests of members of parliament in the oversight function.
3. Partisan attitudes of MPs to parliamentary proceedings; it is claimed that Speakers and the Chair of PAC may not be amenable to initiate deliberations over a report which comes from the administration for which he was a cabinet member.
4. The constitutional requirement for the President to appoint the majority of ministers from parliament, especially when there is a vast difference in the conditions of the MPs and the Ministers. Moreover, MPs are not equipped with the requisite human and material resources like the Ministers or other members of the Executive.
5. The principle of collective responsibility; the political culture may significantly play against an MP’s oversight role when his or her party is in power due to collective responsibility and the respect for authority.
6. Enticement of ministerial appointments by Presidents

It has been well argued that the political will of members of parliament (MP) is the single most important determinant of oversight effectiveness. However, in Ghana’s current political system, other conflicting demands and incentives compete with MPs interest to carry out the oversight function. For instance, it is also being claimed by certain former MPs that politicians must do the executive bidding or risk being marginalized even as a member of parliament.

This explains why the focus of the international community in strengthening the oversight capacity of Parliament for years on success has not yielded the desired results. Pelizo and Stapenhurst (2012) suggest that the single most important factor in the shaping and reshaping of the structure of incentives that parliamentarians are confronted with is represented by voter demands.  

This is part 6 of the article authored by  Valentin Kwasi Mensah, PhD and Alexis de Tocqueville. The part 5 was published on Thursday, July 1, 2021.