Managing dependency on foreign surveillance technologies
Recent reports concerning the ill-treatment of Ghanaian officials invited to a cybersecurity conference abroad have understandably drawn diplomatic and public attention.
Beyond protocol, reciprocity and national dignity, the episode raises a deeper issue that deserves calm national reflection: Ghana’s growing dependence on externally developed security and surveillance technologies.
This is not an emotional argument, nor is it directed at any particular country or company.
It is a strategic concern rooted in how modern surveillance and cybersecurity systems function, and in the long-term implications of relying heavily on technologies over which we do not exercise full and independent control.
Surveillance systems today are not just cameras and control rooms.
They are interconnected platforms that combine video monitoring, data analytics, network connectivity, and links to law enforcement and urban management functions.
In effect, they become part of a country’s digital nervous system.
The question is not whether such systems are useful; they clearly are.
The question is whether dependence on externally designed and maintained systems introduces risks that may not be visible until it is too late.
When such tools are developed outside a country, the user often lacks full visibility into their internal architecture: source code, update mechanisms, embedded permissions, and any remote-access paths used for maintenance.
Even where suppliers act in good faith, a technical imbalance remains: the designer understands the system far better than the end user.
In cybersecurity, trust alone is not sufficient. Control, verification and independent inspection matter.
Potential exposure points
Modern surveillance platforms can, in theory, do more than observe.
They may influence data flows, degrade performance, selectively disable functions, or interact with other connected systems in ways operators do not immediately detect.
For this reason, security planners globally treat externally built critical systems as potential exposure points, not simply as products.
Ghana has practical reasons to reflect on this.
First, Ghana’s expanding CCTV and smart surveillance networks, especially in Accra, now form part of critical urban infrastructure.
These systems go beyond video. They can involve centralised storage, analytics, traffic management and operational links to policing.
Where such platforms are externally supplied and maintained, dependency risks arise if local operators cannot audit, modify or independently validate what the system is doing.
Second, Ghana’s electoral processes rely increasingly on digital tools for registration, verification and results transmission.
These systems are foundational to public trust. Even the perception that such infrastructure is opaque or externally influenced can undermine confidence, regardless of whether or not wrongdoing occurs.
Beyond surveillance and elections, Ghana now runs multiple large national digital platforms that underpin governance, public services and economic activity.
As digital integration deepens, the aggregation of sensitive personal and operational data into centralised systems increases efficiency, but also increases risk.
The same questions arise: who has technical access?, how are systems configured and what happens if one component is compromised?
A related concern is concentration risk: putting too much into interconnected systems without strong segmentation creates single points of failure. Resilience depends not only on strong systems, but also on separation, redundancy and the ability to isolate failures before they spread.
State behaviour
How states behave in practice is instructive.
Some foreign diplomatic missions operating in Ghana treat sensitive communications with extreme caution.
Secure rooms are designed with systems isolated from local networks, installed by vetted technicians flown in specifically for that purpose.
Even construction and management oversight may be tightly controlled.
The lesson is simple: when security truly matters, control is retained.
Ghana also has lessons of its own. Seats of government and other national symbols have at times been built by foreign entities.
Whatever the financing or expertise arrangements, such realities raise legitimate questions about embedded systems, long-term maintenance dependencies, and how fully critical facilities are understood and controlled locally over time.
Another revealing practice is what happens during transitions of power.
Buildings, communications systems and even vehicles are often screened for surveillance devices.
While prudent, an added risk arises when such screening is conducted by foreign security services rather than trusted local experts.
The process becomes opaque, and there is no independent assurance that new vulnerabilities are not introduced during inspection.
Security checks that cannot themselves be verified may offer reassurance without certainty.
A continental example reinforces the point.
The African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, constructed and equipped by an external partner, later became the subject of investigations after unusual data flows were detected from internal systems.
Reports indicated sensitive data was transmitted externally without officials’ knowledge, prompting reviews and upgrades.
The broader lesson is that even prestigious institutions can inherit hidden vulnerabilities when critical systems are externally designed, equipped or maintained.
These concerns are not expressions of hostility.
They reflect a basic security reality: systems you do not fully control may one day behave in ways that conflict with your interests.
What should Ghana do?
First, surveillance and cybersecurity infrastructure must be treated as strategic national assets, not routine procurement items.
Decisions should involve independent technical review, parliamentary oversight and long-term risk assessment.
This same scrutiny should apply to major national digital platforms that store or process sensitive public data.
Second, Ghana should insist on meaningful access to the underlying software of critical systems.
Where possible, source code should be made available for inspection by trusted, independent Ghanaian experts.
Without this, claims of security cannot be fully verified.
Third, greater consideration should be given to open-source software in sensitive systems.
It is not a cure-all, but it allows broader scrutiny, reduces dependence on a single vendor, and makes it harder for hidden backdoors to remain undetected over time.
Finally, Ghana must invest deliberately in local capacity: the ability to understand, audit, adapt and eventually develop core systems.
Universities, local firms and public institutions should be part of a coordinated national strategy aimed at cybersecurity self-reliance.
Diplomatic incidents will pass. But vulnerabilities embedded in national infrastructure can persist for decades.
Ghana should use this moment to think clearly about who designs, controls and ultimately commands the systems meant to safeguard our security.
That conversation is timely and necessary.
Rodney Nkrumah-Boateng.
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