Why Ghana cannot convert ambition into sustained industrial outcomes unless SIGA is insulated, empowered, and financially predictable
Ghana’s vision for industrialisation and export competitiveness under AfCFTA is clear. The country has strategies, cabinet directives, and national plans that point in one direction. The constraint is not ambition. It is the reliability of the institutions that turn policy into durable results. In law and in logic, that reliability largely rests with the State Interests and Governance Authority(“SIGA”).
SIGA is the national watchtower for state influenced enterprises, expected to enforce performance contracts, protect public assets, reduce value leakage, and convert spending into lasting capability. Yet SIGA remains exposed to political weather, short cycle funding, incomplete data access, and contested authority. A watchtower cannot protect what it cannot consistently see.
A guardian cannot enforce discipline if it must negotiate for air.
Emerging markets lose a quarter to a third of contract value due to weak scoping, limited competition, and fragile management. In Ghana, this results in foreign exchange loss, local industry stagnation, delayed import substitution, and weakened value chains. Procurement inefficiencies alone could fund new manufacturing zones for medical supplies, packaging, meters, cables, and maintenance annually.
There is no mystery about what works. Countries that industrialised within a generation protected and financed their guardians of value. Singapore treated independent oversight as national infrastructure, then coupled capital with discipline and insisted on measurable returns. Morocco scaled an automotive ecosystem because public institutions enforced supplier development and capital discipline across the chain. Automotive exports now exceed ten billion dollars each year. Rwanda built enforcement bodies with authority and tools, and procurement credibility followed. Where enforcement is real, compliance becomes culture.
Africa has shown this discipline in places. Ethiopia attracted long horizon investors by tying zone infrastructure delivery to factory outcomes that were monitored and published. Nigeria reduced certain subsidy leakages when oversight structures were ring fenced from day to day convenience. Ghana is not an outlier to any rule. The question is whether oversight will be treated as essential infrastructure or left as a negotiable line item.
Oversight is not a luxury. It is a multiplier of national value. When oversight is neutral and empowered, losses shrink, delivery accelerates, and service reliability improves. When oversight is dependent or under resourced, losses expand quietly through delays, overruns, and leakage. SIGA cannot be asked to protect tens of billions in national value while operating on suspense budgets and partial data. Institutions charged with safeguarding value across decades cannot plan on month to month uncertainty. The Electoral Commission is protected because elections are seen as national destiny. Ghana’s economic destiny deserves the same logic. Industrialisation is not applause at commissioning. It is the reliability of delivery and the durability of assets across fifteen to twenty year timelines. SIGA needs independence and multi year funding to insist on performance contracts, lifecycle costing, and transparent capital discipline across state influenced entities.
The legal foundation already exists. Companies Act 992 codifies fiduciary duty, director care, conflict disclosure, and the obligation to act in the best interest of the company. The gap is not primarily legislative. It is behavioural and operational. SIGA’s role is not to displace boards. It is to ensure boards apply Act 992 consistently and predictably. That requires insulation comparable to other constitutionally protected bodies and steady financing so enforcement does not pause when funding pauses. A sound law applied inconsistently becomes a reference, not a result.
Boards themselves cannot remain spectators to their own duties. Directors are the first line stewards of value. They should interrogate total cost of ownership, insist on competitive tension, align capital with long term value, and decline proposals that look impressive but weaken resilience. When SIGA is insulated and resourced, directors are supported for making those decisions. Stewardship then moves from episodic personal courage to institutional practice.
Demographics sharpen the urgency. Africa’s youth bulge is not an automatic dividend. It is a deadline that requires disciplined governance to translate momentum into industry scale. Without industrialisation, youth become a pressure valve rather than an advantage. Governance discipline is the hinge between these two outcomes. If oversight is insulated and financed, Ghana can convert more domestic spending into capability and reduce the habit of importing what could be produced locally. If oversight remains fragile, the system will continue to leak value and borrow to buy what it might have built.
Global markets favour predictability. Japan institutionalised supplier discipline. South Korea scaled industrial champions with performance contracts. Singapore combined capital, oversight, and strategic returns. Israel linked innovation to export pipelines with accountability. Contexts differ, but a common foundation holds. Guardians of national value were not starved, and their authority was not conditional on wind direction. Ghana does not need to copy any singular model. It needs to anchor one principle. Oversight independence and oversight resourcing are preconditions to any workable model.
A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION
• First, grant SIGA structural insulation with a legal status comparable to the Electoral Commission. Its leadership must have protected tenure and operational independence.
• Second, legislate predictable multi year funding tied to measurable outputs, including the proportion of SOEs under performance contracts, the share of projects using lifecycle costing, and the value recovered through oversight.
• Third, mandate integrated data access for SIGA across all state influenced entities. Real time dashboards on procurement, capital projects, revenue assurance, and performance contract compliance will enable evidence based interventions and faster accountability.
• Fourth, align SIGA’s authority with Act 992 by requiring SOE boards to file annual compliance statements on fiduciary duty, conflict disclosure, and related party exposure, with sanctions for misstatement or non compliance.
• Fifth, build a permanent analytics and investigative capability inside SIGA so detection, intervention, and enforcement decisions are driven by data and executed within short timelines.
• Sixth, require that the appointment of Chief Executive Officers and Boards of Directors for SOEs be conducted in consultation with SIGA through a transparent and competency based process that reduces political interference and aligns leadership with long term performance goals.
• Seventh, transfer the ownership and oversight of state owned enterprise assets from policy ministries to SIGA. Ministries must focus on policy formulation and implementation, while SIGA concentrates on owner stewardship, governance discipline, and value retention.
• Eighth, ensure every performance contract includes total cost of ownership analysis, capital discipline, and supplier development obligations so public expenditure builds local capacity rather than consumption alone.
• Ninth, institutionalise regular public reporting on SOE performance, using simple and comparable metrics that link governance outcomes to national industrialisation objectives.
• Tenth, require all state-owned enterprises to report twice each year to SIGA on performance updates, contract execution progress, revenue outcomes, and remedial actions taken. These biannual filings must be mandatory, comparable, and tied to consequences for accuracy and timeliness.
Funding relies on reducing leakage. Assets under management in Ghana’s Pension fund industry is approximately GHC 78 BILLION. Predictable capital flow and lower leakage enable financing of local projects. Greater credibility reduces capital costs and attracts investors, allowing external funds to focus on frontier tech and strategic growth instead of routine procurement. Good oversight is not a cost centre. It is a value retention engine.
None of this diminishes the role of policy. On the contrary, it clarifies roles so that policy becomes delivery. Ministries set direction and standards, design incentives, and measure national outcomes. SIGA, as shareholder representative, ensures that state influenced enterprises execute with discipline and report with clarity. Boards govern for continuity rather than applause. Management teams deliver services with reliability and cost control. Parliament and the market then monitor, compare, and demand steady improvement. When roles are clear and institutions are insulated, national performance improves even when personalities change.
Ghana’s ambition is credible. The country has the talent, the entrepreneurial energy, and the legal foundation to industrialise with confidence. The next step is institutional. If SIGA is structurally insulated, properly resourced, and continuously empowered to insist on compliance without fear or favour, and if boards apply Act 992 as a daily duty rather than an annual recital, Ghana will convert more spending into capacity and value. This is not a criticism of intentions. It is a calm and constructive call to strengthen the mechanisms that turn intentions into outcomes.
Let the coming decade be defined by steady enforcement, predictable oversight, and patient capital. Protect SIGA so it can protect national assets. Demand Act 992 in practice, not only in principle. Finance oversight as if the future depends on it, because it does. If Ghana moves with quiet determination on these reforms, the country will finance more of its industrial journey from value it already creates. The watchtower will not stand empty. The hourglass will not run dry. And ambition will translate into measurable achievement that endures beyond any single term.
The author Professor Douglas Boateng is a Chartered Director | Chartered Engineer | Social Entrepreneur | Governance and Industrialisation Strategist/Advocate
