As established in Part I of this series, Ghana’s past government-led oil palm initiatives—especially the Presidential Special Initiative (PSI)—revealed long-standing weaknesses in public-sector execution.
These included unrealistic expansion targets, fragmented institutional mandates, mismatched financing, weak post-planting support, poor smallholder integration, neglect of artisanal processors, and deep political interference.
These weaknesses were not unique to the oil palm sector. They mirror the chronic operational and governance failures seen across several state-owned enterprises (SOEs), from agriculture to manufacturing to logistics.
The National Policy on Integrated Oil Palm Development (2026–2032), therefore, represents more than a new programme—it is a test of whether Ghana has truly internalised the lessons highlighted in Part I.
To succeed where PSI and similar programmes failed, the new policy must replace high-visibility announcements with sustained, disciplined implementation anchored in governance, sequencing, and institutional accountability. Its credibility will depend on whether the government can demonstrate consistency, resist political distortions, and uphold the institutional autonomy required for long-term transformation.
Addressing historical failures
1. Patient, long-term financing
Part I showed that PSI’s financing model was structurally flawed because the oil palm’s long gestation cycle was matched with short-term, high-pressure financing.
Farmers were expected to repay loans long before trees reached maturity, creating frustration, defaults, and widespread abandonment.
The new policy directly responds to this mismatch by introducing a $500 million long-term finance window with long-tenor financing aligned with the crop’s growth cycle; up to five years of moratorium on repayments; concessional interest rates; coverage of up to 70 per cent of project costs; sustainability and governance criteria for beneficiaries, and blended finance to de-risk private capital.
This framework replaces PSI’s short-term political enthusiasm with long-term financial realism, offering a financing structure capable of supporting perennial crops sustainably.
2. Government-secured land banks
Part I established that PSI’s mass seedling distribution occurred in the absence of secure land. Many beneficiaries planted on disputed or temporary lands, resulting in fragmentation, low productivity, and abandoned farms.
The 2026–2032 policy introduces: government-secured, climate-suitable land banks, comprehensive mapping, surveying, and registration; enforcement of environmental compliance under Act 1036, and dedicated blocks for private investors, cooperatives, and outgrowers.
This institutional approach addresses the land-access contradictions that weakened PSI and several SOE-led agricultural ventures. It provides predictability, enhances investor confidence, and aligns land allocation with long-term development planning.
3. Strong institutional coordination through TCDA
Part I highlighted the institutional fragmentation that plagued PSI—multiple ministries working without a single leadership authority. This led to duplication, inconsistent directives, and weakened accountability.
The new policy corrects this by assigning full regulatory and coordinating authority to the Tree Crops Development Authority (TCDA). TCDA will oversee:
• Licensing and compliance
• Production and planting plans
• Seed, seedling, and input regulation
• Sector-wide data and traceability
• Market and off-take alignment
• Value-chain regulation
• Monitoring and evaluation
This structure responds directly to the governance failures seen in PSI and multiple SOEs, such as TOR and GIHOC, where diffusion of responsibility led to chronic inefficiency.
5. Empowerment of Smallholders, Women, and Youth — Correcting Structural Exclusion
Part I showed that PSI and similar programmes were estate-centric and failed to meaningfully engage the smallholders who produce most of Ghana’s palm oil. Women and youth were largely peripheral despite their disproportionate contribution to processing and field labour.
The new policy embeds inclusion by introducing:
• Structured Outgrower Partnership Schemes
• Smallholder and Women’s Support Funds
• Mechanisation and maintenance services targeting labour-intensive tasks
• Digital profiling, pricing, and extension systems
• Youth enterprise financing linked to oil palm value chains
This represents a clear shift from historical exclusion to deliberate empowerment, strengthening both equity and productivity.
Broader Lesson: Reforming Ghana’s public investment culture
As established in Part I, Ghana’s agricultural programmes fail not only because of poor design but because of weak execution cultures characterised by:
• Election-year distortions
• Patronage-driven appointments
• Procurement manipulation
• Weak monitoring and evaluation
• Bureaucratic inertia
• Leadership turnover
If the 2026–2032 policy is to succeed, implementation must be insulated from these systemic weaknesses. A new operational culture—anchored in transparency, professionalism, continuity, and strict accountability—is required.
Conclusion
Ghana has never been short of well-crafted policies, national strategies, sector masterplans, or ambitious flagship programmes. From the Presidential Special Initiative to multiple value-chain action plans, the country has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to design excellent policies on paper. What has been consistently missing is implementation discipline—the ability to translate policy intentions into real, measurable outcomes.
The National Policy on Integrated Oil Palm Development (2026–2032) now offers Ghana another opportunity to correct decades of structural weaknesses. But its success hinges on one fundamental shift:
The walk must finally match the talk.
For this policy to succeed where past interventions failed, Ghana must:
• reduce political interference at all stages of implementation;
• insulate technical decisions from election-year pressures;
• strengthen institutional autonomy, especially for TCDA;
• enforce transparency and accountability in procurement and financing;
• ensure policy continuity across political administrations;
• and prioritise execution over rhetoric.
If these conditions are met, the policy can deliver what past programmes could not:
• a competitive, efficient, and self-sufficient oil palm industry;
• a revitalised processing base across industrial and artisanal segments;
• export-ready production grounded in sustainability and traceability;
• and inclusive rural growth led by smallholders, women, and youth.
Ghana has the land, the climate, the labour force, and now a sound policy framework. What the country needs, what it has lacked for decades, is disciplined execution.
If Ghana breaks from its historical pattern of implementing policies only partially or inconsistently, oil palm can finally become a cornerstone of national industrialisation and rural transformation.
The writer is an Agribusiness Enthusiast.