When transparency becomes risk: Combating mobile money fraud in Ghana

Mobile money fraud and digital financial exploitation are rising at an alarming rate in Ghana and across sub–Saharan Africa.

As digital financial services expand rapidly, fraudsters are developing new ways to exploit vulnerabilities in human behaviour and public data on social media, messaging platforms, and digital fundraising platforms, including crowdfunding. 

One of the most concerning trends is fraudsters inferring insider knowledge of customer transactions by monitoring publicly shared payment appeals, donation screenshots, Mobile Money numbers and group saving updates. 

By correlating these public disclosures with transaction timing, user patterns, and network interactions, fraudsters identify active wallets, spending habits, and periods of heightened vulnerability.

This feature article examines these methods in depth, explains their financial and social impacts in Ghana, outlines other modus operandi used by fraudsters, and offers instructive mitigation strategies for clients, mobile money agents, telcos, fintechs, financial institutions, and regulatory bodies.

Publicly shared financial data

Fraudsters are no longer limited to technical hacks or network intrusions. They now exploit the open nature of social media and mobile messaging platforms, where users publicise financial information for legitimate reasons. 

In Ghana, platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, and Instagram are frequently used to solicit donations, share screenshots of Mobile Money transactions, and display group savings contributions.

These public disclosures create fertile ground for fraudsters to:

•    Recognise active wallets with frequent transaction history.

•    Analyse transaction timing and response patterns for predictability.

•    Observe financial trust networks based on repeated mentions or shared contacts.

•    Identify customers whose displayed information indicates imminent large transactions or vulnerabilities such as urgent fund-raising.

For example, a Ghana-based fund-raiser sharing daily updates about donation inflows and a public Mobile Money number on Facebook can unintentionally signal to fraudsters that the account receives frequent payments.

Fraudsters use this publicly available data to prioritise targets that appear active, ready to receive funds and less likely to suspect deceit due to the appearance of community validation.

 Fraudster tactics

Fraudsters also exploit physical attacks, market vulnerabilities and operational inefficiencies by targeting unattended cash points, crowded marketplaces or poorly monitored mobile money agent outlets; for example, they may snatch cash from customers during peak trading hours or impersonate agents at busy kiosks to collect deposits intended for legitimate accounts.

Fraudsters use a range of operational methods beyond social media monitoring. The following explains key techniques actively used in Ghana:

1. Social engineering

Fraudsters impersonate mobile money agents, bank staff, fintech support teams or government officials. 

They contact clients with fabricated issues, such as account suspensions or fraudulent promotions, and trick individuals into disclosing OTP codes or verification credentials.

2. SIM swap and sim cloning

Fraudsters persuade mobile network operators, through falsified documentation or social manipulation, to transfer a victim’s phone number to a SIM card under their control. Once achieved, they reset mobile money passwords and take control of the financial account.

3. Phishing and fake payment portals

Fraudsters create fake websites and payment portals that mimic legitimate mobile money or fintech services. When users log in or enter details, fraudsters harvest credentials and use them for unauthorised transactions.

4. Group savings 

Group savings structures such as Susu or Esusu are often organised via WhatsApp or Telegram. Fraudsters join these groups and exploit shared bank or mobile money details. They may claim to deposit funds, share fraudulent screenshots, and then disappear once trust has been established.

5. Malware and remote access tools

In some cases, fraudsters send infected files or links that install spyware on mobile devices. This software captures credentials and financial data without user consent or knowledge.

Financial impact 

The financial impact of mobile money fraud and digital financial exploitation is significant. In 2024, the Bank of Ghana and mobile network operators reported an increase in fraud cases linked to social engineering and phishing.

These losses impact:

•    Household finances, reducing savings and emergency funds.

•    Small businesses that depend on mobile money for daily operations.

•    Trust in digital financial services, which could slow financial inclusion.

Risk

Many Ghanaians publicly share transaction screenshots to demonstrate transparency, document progress, or encourage others to donate. These actions are culturally embedded within community funding practices.

However, such sharing inadvertently reveals:

•    Mobile Money numbers linked to personal identity

•    Transaction sizes and frequency

•    Network interactions indicating community trust

•    Patterns that fraudsters analyse using simple spreadsheets or automation tools

This public transparency is a form of information leakage that fraudsters exploit with minimal technical skill.

Mitigation strategies 

Effectively addressing fraud requires multi-stakeholder collaboration. Below are specific measures clients, mobile money agents, telcos, fintechs, financial institutions and regulators can implement.

Clients and individual users

1.    Avoid sharing financial transaction screenshots publicly.

2.    Use non-public channels for group savings contributions, such as invite-only platforms.

3.    Enable two-factor authentication and use unique, strong passwords.

4.    Treat OTP and verification codes as confidential information.

Mobile money agents

1.    Educate customers proactively about common fraud techniques at points of interaction.

2.    Verify unusual requests using face-to-face confirmation.

3.    Report suspected fraud attempts to mobile network operators immediately.

Telecommunications operators

1.    Strengthen SIM registration verification using biometric or multi-factor check processes.

2.    Introduce alerts for unusual SIM change attempts.

3.    Partner banks and mobile money providers to flag suspicious activity.